“最严格的监管”和“最严厉的处罚”指示的食品安全治理研究——基于委托代理理论的分析

Food Safety Governance Research under the " Strictest Supervision" and "Strictest Punishment": Based on the Analytical Perspective of Principal-agent Theory

食品安全问题一直是社会各界关注的焦点,运用委托代理模型,剖析政府监管部门与食品企业之间的委托代理关系,分析"四个最严"中"最严格的监管"与"最严厉的处罚"两条指示的经济学机理和作用效果。研究结果表明,提升监管强度和处罚力度可以有效激励食品企业提升努力水平,从而增强食品的安全性。同时,食品企业的努力水平还受市场规模及食品价格等因素影响,并且不同类型的食品受影响的方式也不同。

Food safety issues have always been the focus of attention from all walks of life. This paper mainly uses the principal-agent model to analyze the principal-agent relationship between the government supervision department and the food enterprise,and analyzes the economy mechanism and effect of the " strictest supervision" and " strictest punishment". The research results show that improving the intensity of supervision and punishment can effectively encourage food enterprises to improve their efforts,thus enhancing the safety of food. At the same time,the level of efforts of food enterprises is also affected by factors such as market size and price,and different types of foods are affected in different ways.