公平关切下旅游产品O2O模式的定价与服务策略研究

Pricing and Service Decisions of Tourism O2O Model with Fairness Concerns

针对单个线上销售商和旅行社组成的旅游O2O模式,考虑成员公平关切行为,建立以线上销售商为领导者的Stackelberg模型,构建集中式、分散式与考虑公平关切分散式3种决策情形,研究旅游产品定价与服务策略选择,并分析线上渠道忠诚度和渠道服务信息相对传递效率的影响。研究发现:公平关切会使得双方调整最优策略;当满足一定条件时,线上销售商的公平关切导致旅行社选择提供低服务的"低价旅行团";旅行社公平关切则不会影响消费者。无论对方公平关切程度如何,公平关切最大化是双方的最优策略,导致双方陷入"囚徒困境"。

This study focuses on a dual-channel supply chain consisting of an online seller and an offline travel agency.It considers the channel members’fair concern behaviors,and establishes the Stackelberg model with online sellers as the leader to study the optimal strategy of pricing and service level of tourism products.Models are constructed under three different situations,i.e.,centralized,decentralized with no fair concern and decentralized with fair concern.The impact of the two parties’fairness concern on the optimal strategy and benefits is studied.This study also analyses the impact of online channel loyalty on pricing,service level,and channel member profit.The results show that when the members of the tourism O2O model exhibit the characteristics of fair concern behavior,the two parties will adjust their strategies to obtain higher returns;as the level of fairness of online sellers increases,the travel society will lower the service level,and the travel agencies choose to provide low-cost“cheap tour”to the market when certain conditions are met;however,fair concerns of offline travel agencies will not change the price and service levels of travel products.Regardless of the degree of fairness of the other party,maximizing fairness is the best strategy for both parties,but the fair concern ultimately leads to the prisoner’s dilemma.