声誉积累优势还是绩效积累优势?政府R&D补贴分配中“粘性”效应探究

Reputation Accumulation Advantage or Performance Accumulation Advantage? The Research on the ’Stickiness’ Effect of Government R&D Subsidy Allocation

通过探究政府R&D补贴分配的持续性问题,有利于减少政府行为失范,提高政府R&D补贴效率。分别从声誉积累优势和绩效积累优势探究影响政府R&D补贴分配中“粘性”效应的因素,采用2010-2013年广东省498家制造业民营企业的面板数据,应用转移概率矩阵、Probit回归分析以及PSM方法进行实证检验,结果发现:基于广东的实证数据表明,广东省政府R&D补贴“粘性”效应更有可能是基于绩效积累优势的挑选机制,进一步基于企业创新链视角检验政府R&D补贴“粘性”效应对企业创新的影响发现:政府R&D补贴“粘性”效应有利于企业研发强度提升,对企业不同模式的技术获取战略均存在积极显著的影响,但对企业新产品产值的影响不显著。

By exploring the persistence of government R&D subsidy allocation, it will help reduce government misconduct and promote high-quality development of firms. The paper explores the factors that influence the 'stickiness' effect of government R&D subsidy distribution from the advantages of reputation accumulation and performance accumulation. The panel data of 498 manufacturing private enterprises in Guangdong Province from 2010 to 2013 were applied, and the empirical analysis was carried out by using transfer probability matrix, probit regression analysis and PSM method. It is found that the 'stickiness' effect of government R&D subsidies is more likely to be based on the selection mechanism of performance accumulation advantages. Further examining the impact of the 'stickiness' effect of government R&D subsidies on firms' innovation based on the perspective of firm innovation chain: The 'stickiness' effect of government R&D subsidies is conducive to the improvement of R&D intensity of firms, and has a positive and significant impact on the technology acquisition strategies of different modes of firms. However, the impact on the output value of new products of firms is not significant.