中国情境下公共政策执行主要问题的转变及其制度分析

The Transition of Main Issues of Public Policy Implementation in China and Its Institutional Analysis

近年来,中国公共政策执行的主要问题,从因"揽政"而出现的"乱作为",转变为因"懒政"而出现的"慢作为"和"不作为",如何从理论上解释这种变化,对于解决此类问题至关重要。本文在相关研究基础上,提出了公共政策执行的"路径-激励-监督-能力"分析框架。基于新的分析框架,对党的十八大以来公共政策执行主要问题的转变进行了制度分析,并对该分析框架的适用性和有效性进行了讨论。研究发现,当监察机制较弱时,不论地方官员能力大小和政策路径是否清晰,都可能会出现共谋、揽政等政策执行问题。而当监察机制较强时,对地方官员正向激励的强度是影响政策能否有效执行的关键,并可根据实际需要设计灵活的政策路径。

In recent years, the main issues of public policy implementation in China has changed from the "disorderly actions, caused by "power grab" to the "slow actions" and "inaction" caused by "lazy politics". It is important to explain the transition in theory, in order to find a solution. This paper introduces a "path--incentivesupervision-capacity" analytical framework based on the related research. By this new framework, the paper makes an institutional analysis of such transition since the 18 th CPC National Congress, and discusses the factors influencing the applicability and effectiveness of the framework. The study finds that in the case of weak supervision, public policy implementation may fail regardless of the capacity of local officials or the clarity of policy path. When supervision is strong, the strength of positive incentive is the key to the effective implementation of policy, and the policy path can be flexibly designed according to the real situation.