摘要
基于委托——代理理论,高中学业水平考试改革中存在多重委托——代理关系链。在委托——代理模式下,改革委托人与代理人间相互博弈产生的逆向选择、道德困境致使改革遭遇认知偏差、治理滞后、执行效率偏低及效果偏离目标的困境。完善改革信息传输渠道、建构有力的激励、监督机制是改革突破上述困境的可行之策。
Based on the perspective of principal-agency theory,there are multi-layer principal-agent chains in the Exam Reform of Academic Proficiency for Senior High School.It is adverse selection and moral hazard caused by the dynamic game between the principal and agent at all levels that makes the reform the predicament of the information loss、lagging governance, low efficiency of implementation and deviation of effect from the reform original goals. It is a feasible way to break through the difficulties above by perfecting the information transmission channels, constructing strong incentive mechanisms and supervise mechanisms.
作者
张善超
靳玉乐
Zhang Shanchao;Jin Yule(The Faculty of Education,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715 ,China)
出处
《教育科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第1期48-53,共6页
Education Science
基金
国家社会科学基金2018年度教育学一般课题"新高考时代普通高中教师教学胜任力研究(编号:BHA180161)"
关键词
高中学业水平考试改革
委托--代理关系
逆向选择
道德困境
激励机制
the Exam Reform of Academic Proficiency for Senior High School
the relationship between principal and agent
adverse selection
moral hazard
incentive mechanism