产品停产后服务备件供应链的决策分析与协调契约研究

Spare Parts Supply Chain Coordination Based on Buy-back Contract During End-of-life Period

以产品停产后服务备件供应中断问题为背景,研究了由产品制造商、备件供应商和后市场制造服务商构成的服务备件供应链决策问题和基于回购契约的协调机制。首先针对产品制造商采取末次订购和后市场应急采购策略的情形,构建Stackelberg博弈模型并分析均衡下各企业的最优决策,发现制造商在同时选择末次订购和应急采购时的期望利润低于仅选择末次订购的情形,因而不具有主动选择应急采购的意愿。随后探究了该供应链系统的协调问题,发现回购契约能实现供应链协调,且各企业利润均为回购价格的线性单调函数。通过数值试验进一步展示了实现各成员企业利润帕累托改进的契约组合,并分析了其受成本参数变化的影响。

The decision-making and coordination problems for a spare parts supply chain during the end of product life cycle were studied.The supply chain consists of a product manufacturer,a spare parts supplier and an aftermarket manufacturing service provider,and is dominated by the supplier.Stackelberg game models were established to analyze firms’ decisions when the manufacturer adopts last-time buy and emergency supply strategies to resolve supply disruption.It is discovered that the manufacturer earns less profit when both strategies are adopted,compared with the case where only last-time buy is deployed,thus it doesn’t have the willingness to proactively adopt emergency supply.Further analysis shows that buy-back contracts provided to both the manufacturer and service provider can successfully coordinate the supply chain,and all firms′ profits are linear in buy-back prices.The contracts enabling Pareto improvement were identified through numerical studies,and associated sensitivity analyses were conducted.