环境污染第三方治理委托代理模型研究

Research on Principal-Agent Model for Third-Party Governance on Environmental Pollution

针对当前环境污染第三方治理激励机制尚不完善的现实困境,选取目前环境污染第三方治理过程中政府委托的环境污染第三方治理项目作为研究对象,为了改进环境污染第三方治理激励机制,探究第三方环保服务公司综合实力等对最佳激励强度和政府投资人期望收入的影响,进而得出最佳激励强度与政府投资人期望收入的关系,构建了信息不对称情况下的环境污染第三方治理委托代理模型并做出分析。

In view of the current dilemma that the incentive mechanism of third-party governance on environmental pollution is not perfect,third-party governance of environmental pollution project entrusted by the government in the third-party governance process on environmental pollution is selected as the research object.In order to improve the incentive mechanism of third-party governance of environmental pollution,the comprehensive strength of third-party environmental protection service companies is explored,which effects the best incentive intensity and investors' expected income.Then the relationship between the optimal incentive intensity and the expected income of government investors is obtained,and the principal-agent model of third-party governance on environmental pollution under asymmetric information is constructed and analyzed.