领导干部自然资源资产离任审计是否影响企业税收规避——基于政府官员晋升机制转变视角的准自然实验研究

Leading Officials’ Natural Resources Accountability Audit and Corporate Tax Avoidance——A study based on natural experiment of government leaders’ promotion system

基于双重差分模型,以我国2014年领导干部自然资源资产离任审计为自然实验事件,系统考察了领导干部自然资源资产离任审计与资源型和重污染型企业税收规避强度之间的关系,以及产权性质和财政压力对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现,领导干部自然资源资产离任审计的实施显著降低了资源型和重污染型行业公司的避税强度,且这种效应更多地存在于非国有企业和地方政府不存在财政压力地区的企业中。这表明实施领导干部自然资源资产离任审计能够对企业税收规避行为发挥监督效应。我们的研究为领导干部自然资源资产离任审计实施效果的相关研究提供了直接的经验证据,也为政府税收监管部门提供了间接的指导意义。

Based on DID model and taking the implementation of leading officials' natural resources accountability audit in 2014 as natural experiment, this paper explores the relationship between leading officials' natural resources accountability audit, property arrangement and corporate tax avoidance activities. The empirical results show that the implementation of leading officials' natural resources accountability audit can lead companies to choose less aggressive tax avoidance. Such relationship is more pronounced among private firms and firms located in areas where the government is under lower financial pressure, which provides evidence of an oversight effect of leading officials, natural resources accountability audit on corporate tax avoidance. This research provides empirical evidence for future research in this area and indirect reference to the tax supervision department.