高管权力、审计委员会财务专长与财务重述

Executive Power, Audit Committee’s Financial Expertise and Financial Restatement

公司治理的改革促进了资本市场的健康发展,董事会下设的审计委员会通过发挥重要的治理作用能够有效遏制财务重述行为。本文立足于审计委员会财务专长,探究其对财务重述的影响,并进一步检验高管权力对两者关系的调节效应,同时结合我国国情,深入探究不同产权性质下,高管权力的干预作用。研究发现,审计委员会财务专长能够抑制财务重述的发生;高管权力会影响审计委员会财务专长的发挥;国有企业产权性质下,高管权力对审计委员会财务专长抑制财务重述效果具有更强的干预作用。本文研究结论能够丰富对审计委员会、高管权力的认知,为建设审计委员会、合理分配高管权力、完善公司治理提供了经验证据。

The reform of corporate governance promotes the healthy development of the capital market, and the audit committee under the board of directors plays an important role in governance, which can effectively curb financial restatement. Based on the financial expertise of the audit committee, this paper explores its influence on financial restatement and further tests the moderating effect of executive power on the relationship between the two. Meanwhile, combined with China's national conditions, the intervention effect of executive power under different property rights is further explored. It is found that the financial expertise of audit committee can restrain the occurrence of financial restatement. Executive power interferes with the financial expertise of the audit committee. In state-owned enterprises, the executive power has a stronger intervention effect on the financial expertise of audit committee to restrain financial restatement. It is expected that this study can enrich the cognition of audit committee and executive power, and provide empirical evidence for the development of audit committee, the reasonable distribution of executive power, and the improvement of corporate governance.