股权激励与外部审计师风险应对

Equity Incentives and External Auditors’ Risk Response

股权激励在2016年以来的深化国企改革和完善人才发展等政策文件中多次出现,与此同时,股权激励模式逐渐由股票期权主导向限制性股票主导转变。本文以2010-2017年A股公司为研究对象,从外部审计师风险应对视角,实证检验了股权激励的经济后果。研究发现对于实施了股权激励的公司,外部审计师降低了审计投入和审计收费、出具了更多的标准无保留审计意见;股价下跌幅度对股权激励与外部审计师风险应对之间的关系具有显著的负向调节作用;进一步的中介机制检验表明,股权激励对外部审计师风险应对的影响,是由于股权激励降低了外部审计师感受到的业务风险和审计风险。这些结论对A股公司、投资者、外部审计师和监管层都具有一定的参考价值。

Equity incentives have appeared many times in the policy documents on deepening the reform of state- owned enterprises and improving human resource development since 2016. At the same time, the dominant equity incentive model has gradually changed from stock options to restricted stocks. Taking A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017 as the research object, this paper empirically examines the economic consequences of equity incentives from the perspective of external auditors5 risk response. The study finds that, for companies with equity incentives, external auditors reduce audit input and audit fees and issue more standard unqualified audit opinions. The extent of the slump in stocks has a significant negative moderating effect on the relationship between equity incentives and external auditors5 risk response. Further testing of the moderating mechanism suggests that the impact of equity incentives on external auditors? risk response is due to the fact that equity incentives reduce the perceived business and audit risks of external auditors. These conclusions provide reference for A-share listed companies, investors, external auditors and regulators.