退耕还林补贴政策对农户与政府间博弈行为的影响

Effect of Subsidy Policy for Converting Farmland to Forestry on Game Behavior Between Farmers and Governments

退耕还林工程是一项具有较强公共属性的生态建设工程,其项目收益更多考虑长远的生态、环境等社会收益,而非当期既得经济收益。作为退耕还林工程的行动主体农户与政府对于该项工程的利益诉求不同,使得政府主要用行政补贴的手段以实现生态保护的目的。根据农户与政府的博弈关系,补贴作为一种激励手段,在其数量与形式方面必须达到一定标准,并且具有因地制宜的适应性才能够使得补贴实现其功能。因此不应将退耕还林补贴制度统一化,建议改进现有的补贴方式,将补贴与监管惩罚机制相结合,建立“因地制宜”的退耕还林补贴制度。

The Converting Farmland to Forestry Projection is an ecological construction project with strong public attributes. Its project income takes into account long-term social benefits such as ecological and environmental benefits rather than current vested economic benefits. As the main actors of the project, the farmers and the government have different demands for the benefits of the project, which makes the government mainly use administrative subsidies to achieve the purpose of ecological protection. According to the game relationship between farmers and the government, subsidies, as an incentive means,must meet certain standards in terms of quantity and form, and have adaptability to local conditions in order to enable subsidies to achieve their functions. Therefore, the subsidy system of Converting Farmland to Forestry should not be unified. It is suggested to improve the existing subsidy methods,combine the subsidy with the supervision and punishment mechanism,and establish a subsidy system of Converting Farmland to Forestry according to local conditions.