“征税+限额交易”环境规制下工业共生链演化博弈行为分析

Analysis of Evolutionary Game Behavior of Industrial Symbiosis Chain under the Environmental Regulation of ’Taxation + Cap and Trade’

基于制造商群体现实决策的有限理性,考虑政府对废弃物排放的"限额交易"、"征税+限额交易"及"动态征税+限额交易"等环境规制情形,构建包含上游制造商群体和下游制造商群体的工业共生链模型,研究了不同规制措施对于上下游制造商群体外部减排行为决策的影响。结果表明:静态环境规制下,"征税+限额交易"的混合式环境规制政策相较于"限额交易"的单一环境规则政策对外部减排责任的落实有更良好的推进作用;对演化稳定混合策略而言,"动态征税+限额交易"政策下,征税税率的增长将有效推动下游制造商群体的外部减排意愿,而对上游则为反向推动,呈现出此消彼涨态势。当采取"动态征税+限额交易"制度时,相比于静态规制措施,其对下游的正向环境行为具有更大的促进作用。

Based on the limited rationality of manufacturers’realistic decision-making,considering the government’s environmental regulation of waste emission,such as’cap and trade’,’taxation+cap and trade’and’dynamic taxation+cap and trade’,an industrial symbiosis chain model including upstream manufacturers and downstream manufacturers is constructed.This paper studies the impact of different environmental regulations on the decision-making of external emission reduction behavior of upstream and downstream manufacturers.The results show that under the static environmental regulation,Compared with the single environmental regulation policy’cap-and-trade’,the hybrid environmental regulation policy of’taxation+cap and trade’has a better role in promoting the implementation of external emission reduction responsibility;For hybrid strategy of ESS,under the policy of"dynamic taxation+cap and trad",the growth of taxation rate would effectively promote the external emission reduction intention of downstream manufacturers,while it has a negative impact on the upstream manufacturers,which shows a inverse relationship.When adopting’dynamic taxation+cap and trade’system,compared with static regulations,it has a greater role in promoting downstream positive environmental behavior.