风险规避下二级供应链的低碳减排运营策略

Optimal Emission Reduction Decision for a Two-echelon Supply Chain with Risk-averse Agents

针对由一个风险厌恶型制造商和一个风险厌恶型零售商组成的二级供应链,分别建立了低碳减排约束下零售商为主导者和制造商为主导者的供应链模型。当制造商在碳限额交易政策下会投资减排技术来降低碳排放时,利用均值方差方法求解两类模型的博弈均衡策略。进一步分析集中式供应链决策模型,将其分别与零售商主导和制造商主导供应链的利润和碳排放进行比较。最后通过数值算例验证理论结果并分析了零售商和制造商风险厌恶系数的变化对供应链运营策略的影响。研究结果表明:与零售商主导和制造商主导供应链相比,尽管制造商和零售商合作能够使得供应链利润增加但是存在利润增加的上界值,而且碳排放量可能会增加;对于固定的碳配额,供应链成员的风险厌恶属性使得具有主导地位的成员能够获得更多利润;与零售商主导供应链相比,制造商在其为主导者供应链中会投资水平略低的减排技术但能产生更少的碳排放量。

Considering a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a risk-averse manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer,this paper proposes two optimization models for manufacturer-dominated and retailer-dominated decentralized cases under the constraint of carbon emission reduction.A mean-variance method is used to solve the game equilibrium strategy for each optimization model when the manufacturer invests in the emission reduction technology to reduce the carbon emissions under the cap-and-trade regulation.An optimization model for the centralized case is further proposed and compared with those two optimization models mentioned above.Finally,several numerical examples are used to illustrate the theoretical results and to study the effects of risk aversion coefficients on operational decisions of the supply chain.The results show that,compared with manufacturer-dominated and retailer-dominated supply chains,cooperation between the manufacturer and the retailer increases the profit of the supply chain and may reduce the carbon emissions,while there is an upper bound for the increase of the profit.For a fixed carbon cap,the risk aversion attribute makes the dominant member gain more profit.Compared with the retailer-dominated supply chain,the manufacture in the manufacturer-dominated supply chain invests in the emission reduction technology at a slightly lower level and less carbon emissions are emitted.