装配式建筑政府激励策略的演化博弈与仿真研究——基于政府补贴视角下

An Evolutionary Game and Simulation Study on Government Incentive Strategy of Prefabricated Buildings——From the Perspective of Government Subsidy

为了推动装配式建筑在我国的广泛应用,实现建筑业的转型升级,在自然人有限理性观点的基础上,就地方政府补贴策略对建设单位应用策略的影响构建了演化博弈分析模型,并对双方的稳定状态和选择策略进行了分析。通过存流量图建立了系统动力学模型,仿真结果表明:从长远来看,政府增加补贴额度与检查成本并不能提高建设单位的应用概率,而政府的检查力度与建设单位的间接收益对建设单位的应用概率有直接影响。政府应从合理调整补贴额度、完善惩罚机制、降低开发成本、加大宣传力度四个方面着手来激励建设单位积极应用装配式建筑。

In order to promote the wide application of prefabricated buildings in China and realize the transformation and upgrading of the construction industry,an evolutionary game analysis model is built on the basis of the limited rationality of natural persons to analyze the influence of local government subsidy strategies on the application strategies of construction units,and the stable state and selection strategies of both parties are analyzed.The simulation results show that,the increase of government subsidy amount and inspection cost can not improve the application rate of the construction unit,but the inspection intensity and the indirect income of the construction unit have a direct impact on the application probability in the long run.The government should reasonably adjust the subsidy amount,perfect the punishment mechanism,reduce the development cost and intensify the publicity to encourage the construction unit to actively apply the prefabricated buildings.