总经理独立性、股权制衡度与国企过度负债

General Manager Independence,Equity Balance and Excessive Debt of Soes

选取2012—2017年沪深A股国有上市公司作为研究样本,考察了总经理独立程度对国企过度负债的影响以及股权制衡度的调节作用。研究发现,总经理独立程度与国有企业过度负债负相关,且企业的股权制衡程度越高,这种关系就越显著。该研究结论为国有企业通过建立职业经理人制度推进混合所有制改革,进而遏制过度负债,提供了经验证据。

Curbing excessive debt of state-owned enterprises is a major measure to prevent and defuse systemic financial risks. From 2012 to 2017, China's a-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen were selected as the research samples to study the influence of general manager independence degree on excessive debt of state-owned enterprises and the moderating effect of ownership balance degree. The study finds that the degree of general manager independence is negatively correlated with the excessive debt of state-owned enterprises, and the greater the degree of ownership balance of state-owned enterprises, the more significant this relationship is. The research conclusion provides empirical evidence for state-owned enterprises to promote mixed ownership reform and curb excessive debt by establishing professional manager system.