道德谓词的经验基础

On the Experiential Bases of Moral Predicates

道德谓词是否描述了实在的属性,这是元伦理学中一个颇具争议性的难题。如果从吉奇关于表语形容词和定语形容词的区分出发,首先绕开实在性难题,仅从认知经验(现象学)的角度作出分析,那么,在熟练的道德判断者那里,包含道德算子的道德谓词具有领受度(quanta)经验,虽然它们不描述实质的(real or substantial)属性,也没有明晰的内容,但可以是一种直接的和自发的经验。作为非推论性的或非派生性的经验,领受度经验完全不同于且不可还原为感受质(qualia)经验。因此,即使不存在实在的道德属性,也会有相关的道德经验;而如果承认这种经验就是一类心灵属性,那么它们在一种弱的意义上也可以具有实在性。

Whether moral predicates describe real properties or not is a controversial problem in metaethics.If one sets it aside and starts from P.Geach s distinction between predicate and attributive adjectives,and gives an analysis based on cognitive(phenomenological)experiences,then a person who maturely makes a moral judgment will possess quanta experiences about morality.Such experiences are direct and automatic even though they do not describe real or substantial properties and have vague contents.Being non-inferential and un-derived,quanta are very different from and irreducible to qualia.As such,even if real moral properties do not exist,we have relevant moral experiences,and if such experiences are accepted as properties of mind,they will in a weak sense be real.