客户地理距离邻近与公司信息质量

Customers’ Geographical Distance Proximity and Corporates’ Information Quality

本文以2008—2014年A 股上市公司及其前五大客户为样本,实证检验客户地理距离对公司信息质量的影响。结果发现:当客户在地理距离上邻近上市公司时,能够显著抑制公司的真实盈余管理和财务舞弊;当公司与客户关系不紧密(二者之间信息交流不充分且合谋收益低)、公司的管理层代理问题严重(客户有监督动机)或者公司与客户之间交通不便(实地考察的成本较高)时,邻近的客户能降低沟通成本和监督成本,从而更显著地抑制真实盈余管理和财务舞弊,这证实了客户地理距离邻近在公司治理中的重要作用。

Based on the sample of 2008—2014 A-share listed companies and their top five customers,we empirically test the influence of customers’ geographical distance on the corporates’ information quality.Results show that when customers are geographically close to listed companies,they can significantly restrict companies’ real earnings management and financial fraud.When the relationship between the company and the customer is not close,that is, the exchange of information between the two is insufficient and the colluding income is low;or when the company’s agency problem is serious,that is,the customers have motivation to play a supervisory role;or when the transportation between the company and the customer is inconvenient,that is,the cost of information exchange is high,customers’ distance proximity can reduce communication and supervision costs, thus improves information quality more significantly.The overall results confirm the important role of customers’ distance proximity in corporate governance.