摘要
蛋鸡养殖是重要的污染源,政府环境规制是促进蛋鸡养殖场实施清洁生产行为,进而从根源上解决蛋鸡养殖污染的有效途径。本文通过构建双种群进化博弈模型,分析了政府环境规制强度和蛋鸡养殖场清洁生产行为选择决策的过程、方向、进化稳定策略及其影响因素。结果表明:蛋鸡养殖场实施清洁生产行为和政府进行高强度环境规制的成本、蛋鸡养殖场产出鸡蛋的单位产品价格以及双方行为所形成的社会效益是双方策略选择的重要影响因素,提出应加大补贴与税收减免等相关政策优惠力度、建立绿色鸡蛋品牌以提高养殖场收益以及加强政府监管来提高环境效益和社会公信力等对策建议。
The breeding of laying hens is an important source of pollution.The government's environmental regulation is an effective way to promote the implementation of cleaner production behavior in laying hen farms,and then to solve the pollution of laying hens from the root cause.By constructing a two-population evolutionary game model,this paper analyzed the process,direction,evolutionary stability strategy and its influencing factors of government environmental regulation intensity and decision-making of clean production behavior in laying hens.The results showed that the cost of implementing clean production in laying hen farms and the government's high-intensity environmental regulation were too high,the price per unit of egg produced by the laying hen farm and the social benefits formed by the actions of both parties were important factors influencing the strategic choices of both parties.It is necessary to increase preferential policies such as subsidies and tax reductions,establish green egg brands to increase farm income and strengthen government supervision to improve environmental efficiency and social credibility.
作者
董金朋
张园园
孙世民
DONG Jin-peng;ZHANG Yuan-yuan;SUN Shi-min(School of Economy and Management,Shandong Agricultural University,Taian 271018,China)
出处
《黑龙江农业科学》
2019年第7期140-144,共5页
Heilongjiang Agricultural Sciences
基金
山东省社会科学规划项目(18DGLJ08)
关键词
政府
蛋鸡养殖场
环境规制
清洁生产
进化博弈
government
laying hen farm
environmental regulation
cleaner production
evolutionary game