保兑仓模式下多任务委托代理激励机制研究

Research on Multitask Principal-Agent Incentive Mechanism Based on Confirming Warehouse Finance

为了研究保兑仓融资模式下商业银行与物流企业长期合作时的激励契约设计问题,运用委托代理理论和逆向归纳法,分别构建长期静态激励模型和长期动态激励模型,并求解出两种模型下激励契约的最优参数,通过数值模拟对两种模型得到的结果进行对比分析。研究表明,动态激励机制对银行更有利,银行可以设置不同的激励强度来引导物流企业付出相应的努力水平。此研究考虑了银行和物流企业长期合作和多任务委托代理的情况,完善了保兑仓模式下激励契约的研究。

In order to study the incentive contract design of long-term cooperation between commercial banks and logistics enterprises under confirming warehouse financing, the long-term static incentive model and long-term dynamic incentive model are established respectively by using principal-agent theory and backward induction. The optimal parameters of incentive contract under the two models are calculated, and the results are compared and analyzed by numerical simulation. The study shows that the dynamic incentive mechanism is more beneficial to banks and banks can set different incentive coefficients to guide logistics enterprises to make corresponding efforts. Long-term cooperation and multitask principal-agent between banks and logistics enterprises are considered and the research on incentive contract of confirming warehouse is improved.