后危机时代政府干预与银行信贷——基于国有经济视角

Government Intervention and Bank Credit in the Post-Crisis Era——From the Perspective of State-Owned Economy

本文利用我国2007-2016年的省级面板数据,对后危机时代政府干预与银行信贷以及不良贷款率进行了实证研究。本文发现:地方政府干预显著带来地区信贷增长以及不良贷款率下降;地方政府通过对国有经济进行干预,可以显著带来地区信贷增长,但对降低地区不良贷款率不显著。进一步研究发现:东部地区政府干预有助于提高地区信贷增长并降低不良贷款率;西部地区政府通过干预国有经济能带来地区信贷增长;无论是东部、中部还是西部,政府通过对国有经济的干预降低地区不良贷款率均不会产生太大效果。

This paper uses the provincial panel data of China from 2007 to 2016 to conduct empirical research on government intervention, bank credit and non-performing loan ratio in the post-crisis era. This paper finds that local government intervention has significantly brought about regional credit growth and a decline in non-performing loan ratios;local governments’ intervention through the state-owned economy can significantly bring about regional credit growth, but it is not significant for reducing regional non-performing loan ratios. Further research finds that government intervention in the eastern region will help increase regional credit growth and reduce non-performing loan ratios;western governments can bring regional credit growth by intervening in the state-owned economy;whether in the eastern, central or western regions, the government intervenes in the state-owned economy to reduce the regional non-performing loan ratio will not produce much effect.