家庭农场的雇佣合约:结构、特征及其治理

Employment Contracts of Family Farms: Structure,Characteristics and Governance

本文应用合约经济学的视角,考察了现阶段家庭农场雇佣合约的结构,发现农场主嵌入农场生产管理的程度导致了农场主对农场内部经营管理信息的掌握程度呈现差异性,这种差异进一步形塑了农场的不同雇工特征。通过进一步梳理信息不对称和农业经济自身的特点,本文发现不同的家庭农场在面临不同程度的信息不对称时,试图通过调整雇佣合约的结构来降低交易成本,从而改善合约的缔结和治理状况。为了追求不完全合约的事前和事后效率,家庭农场通过熟人的网络关系、强化的私人关系、隐形的竞争关系等方式来实现“以关系治理合约”,从而最大程度地优化家庭农场的生产和管理。对于家庭农场而言,这种“以关系治理合约”得以实践的基础是乡土社会中农场主与雇工之间特有的信息结构。

This paper uses the theory of contract economics to explore the employment phenomenon on the current family farms.It points out that the internal information difference of family farms is an important cause of the incomplete characteristics of employment contracts on the family farms.By further combing the information asymmetry and the characteristics of the agricultural economy itself,this paper finds that different family farms try to reduce the transaction cost by adjusting the structure of the employment contract when they face different degrees of information asymmetry,thus improving the contract conclusion and governance.In order to pursue the anterior and posterior-efficiency of incomplete contracts,family farms adopt the strategy of “governing contracts by relationship” to improve the production and management of family farms.This strategy is available through the acquaintances’ relationships,intensive personal relationships,and invisible competitive relationships among rural networks.For family farms,the information structure between the farmers and the employed peasants might be the social background where the above strategy occurs.