考虑消费者环境偏好的闭环供应链奖惩与补贴机制研究

A Study of Closed-loop Supply Chain with Reward-Penalty and Subsidy Mechanism Considering Consumers′ Environmental Preferences

考虑消费者具有环境偏好差异,构建分散决策下无政府机制、基于产品环保度的奖惩机制、基于废品回收量的补贴机制以及基于奖惩与补贴双机制下的闭环供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,求解模型得出产品的零售价、回收价等决策变量。研究表明:当无政府介入市场时,采取不同闭环供应链战略的企业专注各自的细分市场,定价策略很大程度受消费者环境偏好影响。与无政府机制相比,奖惩与补贴双机制下主动回收的制造商利润增加,不回收的制造商利润减少,但产品环保总量和废品回收量增加,说明奖惩与补贴机制能有效引导制造商的回收积极性,并有利于整个环境的环保,同时,零售商与回收商利润的增加也促使他们积极地参与闭环供应链,从而使得整个闭环供应链得以协调。

Affected by consumers′ differences in environmental preferences,the decentralized decision-making models of the non-Reward-Penalty Mechanism as well as the Reward-Penalty Mechanism which is composed of product environmental protection or subsidization based on waste recycling quantity or product environmental protection and subsidization based on waste recycling quantity were constructed.By solving and comparing the results of these models,the product retail price and recycling price and other decision variable were obtained respectively.Research shows that when there is no government intervention in the market,companies adopting different closed-loop supply chain strategies focus on their respective market segments,and the pricing strategy is largely influenced by consumer environmental preferences.Compared with the non-Reward-Penalty mechanism,the profit of the recycling manufacturers under the dual mechanism of reward,penalty and subsidy increases,the profit of non-recycling manufacturers decreases,but the total level of environmental protection and recycling amount of wastes increases,indicating that the incentive and punishment mechanism effectively guides manufacturing and promotes the environmental protection of the entire environment.Meanwhile the increase of the retailers’ and recyclers’ profits has prompted them to actively participate in CLSC,thus enabling the entire closed-loop supply chain to be coordinated.