风险偏好下协作型众包项目绩效激励机制研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Performances of Cooperative Crowdsoucing Projects Based on Risk Preference

采用委托代理模型研究了由多个接包方参与的协作型众包项目绩效激励问题,建立并求解了基于总产出的众包绩效激励模型(TR),并与基于个人产出的激励模型(NR)进行了详细比较。研究表明,众包项目保留任务量较低时,接包方利己性努力和利他性努力与项目协作效应正相关,与参与成员数量及风险偏好程度负相关;保留任务量较高时,风险偏好会提高利己性努力,却会降低利他性努力。风险偏好和接包方数量的上升均会降低发包方确定性经济收益;发包方更偏好TR模式。

The principal-agent model was used to study the incentive problems of collaborative crowdsourcing projects consisting of multiple crowdsourcees.The performance incentive model based on total output of crowdsourcing(TR) was established and solved,and comparison was made in detail with the incentive model based on the individual output(NR).The results show that,when crowdsourcing projects retain a lower amount of tasks,the self efforts and altruistic efforts of the crowdsourcee are positively related to the project cooperative effect and negatively correlated with the number of participants and the degree of risk preference;otherwise,the risk preference improves the self-interest efforts,but reduces the altruistic efforts.The risk preference and the rising number of crowdsourcee can reduce the deterministic economic benefits of the crowdsourcer,and the crowdsourcer prefers the TR model.