摘要
基于制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型,考虑引入个性化增值服务对线上交易、线下取货(buy online and pick up in store)的BOPS交叉渠道运营影响问题。结果显示无论在双线同价还是不同价下,个性化增值服务的引入不会影响制造商的批发价和利润,但会增长零售商和供应链利润,且这种增长在不同价下更明显。个性化增值服务的引入增长了均衡价格和线上成交量,减少了零售商线下运营成本,改善了线上下运营的衔接能力,更好地实现了O2O本意。最后,运用算例分析验证了结果。
Based on the Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as the leader,the cross-channel operation problem of introducing personalized value-added service under the new O2 O mode "buy online and pick up in store(BOPS)" was discussed.The results of current evidence show that whether the online and offline prices are the same or not,the introduction of personalized value-added service does not affect the wholesale price and profit of the manufacturer,but rather it increases the profits of the retailer and the supply chain.This increase is more obvious in the case of different prices online and offline.The introduction of personalized value-added service not only increases the equilibrium price and online trading volume but also reduces operating costs and improves the ability to connect online and offline of the retailer,which better meet the original intention of O2 O.Finally,these findings were verified by numerical simulation.
作者
严建援
李雅婷
YAN Jian-yuan;LI Ya-ting(Business School,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)
出处
《工业工程与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期130-138,共9页
Industrial Engineering and Management