高管团队薪酬差距、董事会监督能力与企业研发投入

TMT Horizontal Pay Disparities, Board Supervisory Ability and Enterprise’ R&D Investment

高管团队薪酬差距的经济后果已经受到了广泛关注,但鲜见实证研究探讨高管团队水平薪酬差距对企业研发投入的影响。基于社会比较理论和委托代理理论,本研究剖析了高管团队水平薪酬差距、董事会监督能力与企业研发投入三者之间的逻辑关系。利用2007~2016年中国制造业上市企业的经验数据,本研究发现:第一,高管团队水平薪酬差距越大,企业研发投入越少;第二,纳入董事会监督能力的情境作用后发现,董事会规模、董事会流动率与两职分离将弱化高管团队水平薪酬差距对企业研发投入的负向影响。此外,拓展分析后发现,高管团队水平薪酬差距对企业研发投入的负向影响将进一步传导至企业绩效,最终导致低水平的企业绩效。本研究拓展了文献对相对薪酬与企业研发决策两者关系的认识,对企业改善公司治理结构亦具有重要的现实意义。

The economic consequences of TMT horizontal pay disparities have been widely concerned,but few studies have empirically explored the impact of TMT horizontal pay disparities on the R&D investment of enterprise.Based on the social comparison theory and principal-agent theory,this study analyzes the logical relationships among TMT horizontal pay disparities,board supervisory ability,and enterprise’R&D investment.Using the empirical data of Chinese manufacturing listed companies from 2007 to 2016,this study shows:First,TMT horizontal pay disparities have negative impact on enterprise’R&D investment.Second,incorporating the situational role of board supervision ability,it finds that board size,board turnover and duality weaken the negative impact of TMT horizontal pay disparities on enterprise’R&D investment.Furthermore,the negative impact of TMT horizontal pay disparities on the enterprises’R&D investment will further transmit the enterprises’performance and eventually lead to low performance.This study expands the literature’s understanding of the relationship between relative compensation and enterprise’R&D decisions and has important practical significance for enterprises to improve their corporate governance.