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论问题中央对手方政府救助与破产的规则构建

On the Rule Construction of the Bail-out and Bankruptcy of the Failing Central Counterparty
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摘要 中央对手方自身风险问题已成为国际关注热点。迄今为止,我国在中央对手方政府救助与破产领域,相关规则欠缺、制度不健全等,影响金融市场稳定、系统性风险应对、以及交易所业务海外经营。中央对手方的“系统重要性”,使得“破产”与“政府救助”问题复杂化。我国应借鉴国际经验,解决例如中央银行流动性支持、救助对象的界定、破产或政府救助的触发时间及程序等问题,形成双重救助机制的央行最后贷款人的法律框架;规则体系分明的触发时间标准,且在法律框架内赋予监管机构特定自由裁量权;识别“系统重要性”的法律和监管框架,明确救助对象为系统平台而非会员机构;推动交易所公司制改革、以及法律规则的系统性构筑。 The issue of the Central Counterparty(CCP)has been the focus of international attention.There have not beensound legislations,rules,or systems on the bankruptcy and bail-out aspects of the failing CCP in China.It has directly restricted the healthy and orderly development of financial market,the prevention or response of systematic risk,and the overseas business operation of exchanges.The"systemic importance"of CCP makes the Bankruptcy and Bail-out more complicated,controversial,and relationship unclear where it relates to recovery and resolution.The international standard and experiences of other countries should be referred to when dealing issues ofcentral bank's liquidity assistance,assistance object,triggered time and procedure of the Bankruptcy and Bail-out.Firstly,the legal framework of Lender of Last Resort should be developed.Secondly,a system of rules should be developed including law,administrative regulation,departmental rules and others on triggered time of the Bankruptcy and Bail-out.The financial regulator,which is executive director of financial stability,can be empowered with certain discretionary power within the legal framework.Thirdly,the legal framework and the regulatory framework should be built to identify systemically important financial institutions.Assistance object should clearly be CCP itself rather than clearing members.Fourthly,it should promote the demutualization of exchanges,the formulation and revision of the relevant laws on the Bankruptcy and Bail-out of CCP.
作者 潘拥军 Pan Yongjun
出处 《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第7期62-72,共11页 Securities Market Herald
基金 国家社科基金重点项目“自贸区金融法治问题研究”(14AFX018)阶段成果
关键词 中央对手方 政府救助 破产 系统性风险 central counterparty(CCP) bankruptcy bail-out systematic risk
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