摘要
“自主性”并非决定法律人格赋予的本质属性,“自主性”的人工智能与人类也不具平等性,人工智能“自主性”与法律人格不可通约,这是讨论的前提。肯定说所引证的论据未臻成熟,法律人格的制度价值仅在责任承担,可以按照“尚能”与“不再”的关系完善责任制度,而非赋予法律人格。否定说虽主张无须赋予法律人格,但立法应对人工智能“近人性”做出制度回应,一方面“近人性”是人类情感的投射,立法应摒弃过度“近人化”思维,另一方面当突破公序良俗对待人工智能时,人类行为应予规制,以守护人类共同价值。
Autonomy is not the essential attribute which determines the endowment of legal personality, and its AI is not equal to human being. The incommensurability of the autonomy of AI and legal personality works as the precondition of this issue. The arguments cited by the affirmative views are too far to be mature, and the systematical values of legal personality lie merely on the commitment of responsibility. So, instead of endowing legal personality, the liability system could be perfected through the relationship between “Still capable of” and “No longer capable of”. Though the ones who hold negative propositions believe it is unnecessary to endow legal personality, yet the legislation should respond systematically to the near humanity. On the one hand, near humanity is the reflection of human emotions and the legislation should abandon the thought of excessive near humanity;on the other, there should be regulations on the behaviors which break through the public order and moral and infringe AI, in order to protect the common values of human beings.
作者
郭明龙
王菁
Guo Minglong;Wang Jing
出处
《交大法学》
CSSCI
2019年第3期20-31,共12页
SJTU Law Review
基金
2019年度教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“数据权之确权与交易利用规则研究”(项目号:19YJA820013)的阶段性成果