草原生态补奖政策能抑制牧户超载过牧行为吗?——基于社会资本调节效应的分析

Impact of grassland eco-compensation policy on herders’ overgrazing behavior: the moderating role of social capital

草原生态补奖政策通过政府行政手段干预牧户超载过牧行为,成为减少牧区牲畜养殖数量和保障草原可持续利用的政策之一。在政策执行过程中,牧户通过长期交往形成的社会信任、关系网络等社会资本,不仅可以有效解决草原生态保护中政策监督执行成本高等问题,还能形成减畜的集体行动从而确保政策目标的实现。探讨社会资本与草原生态补奖政策对牧户超载过牧行为的影响效应具有必要性和现实意义。基于此,本文从理论上阐述了草原生态补奖政策对牧户超载过牧行为的影响机理,并基于内蒙古、甘肃两省474户牧户实地调查数据,运用线性回归模型和分组回归模型,检验了草原生态补奖政策对牧户超载过牧行为的影响效应及社会资本对草原生态补奖政策影响牧户超载过牧行为的调节作用。结果表明,草原生态补奖资金对牧户超载过牧行为具有显著的正向影响,而政策监管对牧户超载过牧行为的影响效应为负。社会网络在政策监管影响牧户超载过牧行为中发挥了负向调节作用,社会信任对草原生态补奖资金和政策监管影响牧户超载过牧行为均具有负向调节作用。此外,是否草场流转、非牧业收入占比对牧户超载过牧行为具有正向影响,而家庭收入对牧户超载过牧行为有显著的负向影响。基于以上分析,建议政府优化草原生态补奖资金的发放方式,加强政府对牧户减畜的监管力度,同时发挥社会资本在草原生态补奖政策执行过程中的作用。

Grassland eco-compensation policy is a policy initiative to regulate herders’ overgrazing behavior through government administrative measures in order to reduce livestock number and to achieve the sustainable utilization of grassland. During policy implementation,social capital,such as social trust and social network,formed by long-term interaction among herder households,is useful in trimming the high costs related to government supervision and policy implementation in grassland protection and reducing livestock number by collective actions,so as to realize policy objectives. It is necessary to discuss the effect of social capital and grassland eco-compensation policy on herders’ overgrazing behavior. This paper analyzes the influence of grassland eco-compensation policy on herders’ overgrazing behavior and the role of social capital in moderating this relationship. A linear regression model and a grouping regression model are employed based on survey data of 474 herder households in Inner Mongolia and Gansu. The results show that: the compensation funds and government supervision have the positive and negative influences on herders ’ overgrazing,respectively. Moreover,social network plays a negative moderating role in the relationship between government supervision and herders’ overgrazing behavior,whereas social trust plays a negative moderating role in the relationship between compensation funds and herders’ overgrazing behavior,as well as the relationship between supervision and herders ’ overgrazing behavior. Meanwhile,herders’ overgrazing behavior is negatively associated with transfer status of grassland and the proportion of non-farm income,and is positively related to household income. Based on the above conclusion,it is suggested that the government should optimize the type of distributed grassland eco-compensation funds,strengthen the government’s supervision on herders’ livestock reduction,and give full play to the role of social capital in the implementation of grassland eco-compensation policy.