投机行为下缺口补助PPP项目激励与约束机制设计

Design of Incentive and Restraint Mechanism for Viability Gap Funding PPP Project under Speculative Behavior

为有效遏制可行性缺口补助PPP项目中社会资本不努力经营、谎报运营收益等机会主义行为,基于委托代理理论从政府激励与约束视角出发建立两阶段效用模型,分别求得社会资本方最佳努力水平、运营收益谎报系数以及政府方最佳绩效激励系数、经济产出奖惩系数,为此类项目政府激励与约束机制设计提供参考。

In order to effectively curb the social’s speculative behavior that does not work hard and lie about the operating income in viability gap funding PPP project,the paper establishes a two-stage utility model based on the principal-agent theory from the perspective of government incentives and constraints,and obtains the best effort level and best operating income falsehood coefficient of social capital,as well as the government’s best performance incentive coefficient and the best economic output reward and punishment coefficient,provides reference for incentive and restraint mechanism design for similar projects.