自我同一性问题——帕菲特与海德格尔

The Problem of Personal Identity: Parfit and Heidegger

洛克认为通过记忆将伴随经验的自我意识连缀起来,就构成了自我同一性。帕菲特对洛克的标准加以修正,形成了经验论自我同一性的高级版本。他进一步消解自我的重要性,而以一种经验论的“关系R”取代,认为由此可以在道德上摆脱自我的囚笼。在反对实体性的自我观念这一点上,海德格尔跟帕菲特一致,但是他并不同意知觉体验能够提供出自我,更不认同无自我理论。他用柏拉图的“木马喻”表明,恰恰先有自我才能形成对事物的知觉和认识。虽然在存在论层面上的自我被海德格尔描述为在去存在或追求存在中构建起来的关系网络,但自我并不丧失其实存,本真的自我是存在的真理的本现之所。海德格尔同帕菲特在自我同一性问题上的分歧,展示出现象学同心智哲学的争执和对话的可能角度。

Locke believes that self-identity consists in binding the self-consciousness accompanied by experiences through memory.Parfit revises Locke s standard to form an advanced version of empiricist self-identity.He further dispels the importance of the self,and replaces it with an empirical“Relation R”,arguing that it allows us morally to get rid of the cage of the self.Heidegger is consistent with Parfit in opposing the substantive self-concept,but he does not agree that the perceptual experience can provide self,and does not agree with the non-egological theory.He uses Plato s“wooden horse of Troy metaphor”to show,only if there is a self,can a perception and understanding of things be formed.Although the self on the ontological level is described by Heidegger as a network of relationships built in“to be”or pursuit of being,the self does not lose its existence,and the authentic self is the essencing space of the truth of being.The divergence of views about the self between Heidegger and Parfit demonstrate the debates and possible angles of dialogue between phenomenology and the philosophy of mind.