信息披露与银行信贷资源配置的实证研究

Empirical Study on Information Disclosure and Bank Credit Resource Allocation

文章选取2007-2016年深市上市公司为研究对象,从借款利率、期限和金额三个方面检验了信息披露质量对银行信贷资源配置的影响,并结合我国特有的制度背景和市场状况,引入企业所有权性质和所处行业地位两项因素,具体考察了银行对不同信息披露水平企业发放借款时的差异。结果发现,较高的信息披露质量可以显著降低银行借款利率、延长借款期限、增大借款金额;进一步研究发现,上述关系在非国有企业和市场地位较弱的企业中更为显著,而在国有企业和市场地位较强的企业中不显著或显著性较弱。研究结果说明,提高信息披露质量,缓解与银行间的信息不对称,降低代理成本可以使银行更愿意为企业提供借款,这为非国有企业提供了一条缓解信贷歧视的思路。

In this paper,the listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2016 are chosen as the research objects to examine the impact of information disclosure quality on the allocation of bank credit resources from three aspects: borrowing interest rate,term and amount.Moreover,according to China’s unique institutional background and market conditions,two factors are introduced,namely,the nature of enterprise ownership and the position of the industry.Specifically,the differences between banks in issuing loans to enterprises with different information disclosure levels are examined.It is found that the higher quality of information disclosure can significantly reduce the interest rate of bank borrowing,extend the borrowing periods and increase the amount of borrowing.It is shown in further research that the above relationship is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises with weaker market position,but not or less significant in state-owned enterprises and enterprises with stronger market position.The conclusions of this paper show that improving the quality of information disclosure,alleviating information asymmetry between banks and reducing agency costs can make banks more willing to provide loans for enterprises,which provides a way to alleviate credit discrimination for non-state-owned enterprises.