民营资本入股降低了城市商业银行的不良贷款率吗?

Does Private Capital Decrease the Non-performing Loan Ratio of City Commercial Banks?

基于2007-2016年中国城市商业银行数据,本文分析了民营资本入股对城市商业银行不良贷款率的影响,结果表明,民营资本入股降低不良贷款率的效果仅在地方政府控股型城商行存在,且该效应在国有经济占比高以及金融发展落后等地方政府干预程度高的地区更为明显。进一步探究地方政府控股型城商行中民营资本异质性特征与降低不良贷款率的关系后发现:与外地股东相比,本地股东因在监督城商行和信息提供方面具有比较优势,更有助于降低不良贷款率;仅有“散沙式”民营小股东难以制衡地方政府对城商行的掏空作用。尽管民营资本大股东一般在降低城商行不良贷款率中起重要作用,但当民营股东处于依赖外源融资的资本密集型行业时,引入多个大股东反而不利于降低不良贷款率。

Based on the data of city commercial banks from 2007 to 2016, this paper analyzes the impact of private capital participation on the non-performing loan ratio of city commercial banks. The results show that the effect of lowering the non-performing loan ratio by private capital is only found in local government-controlled city commercial banks. The effects are more pronounced in areas with high levels of state-owned economy and poor financial development. Local government intervention in these areas is higher. This paper further explores the relationship between the heterogeneity characteristics of private capital and the reduction of non-performing loan ratio. The study finds that(1) compared with foreign shareholders, local shareholders’ supervision and information provision to city commercial banks are more conducive to reducing the non-performing loan ratio;(2) The major shareholders of private capital play an important role in reducing the non-performing loan ratio of city commercial banks. It is difficult to balance the tunnel effect of local governments on city commercial banks when there are only "sand-sand" private minority shareholders. However, it should be noted that when shareholders are in a capital-intensive industry that relies on external financing, the introduction of multiple large private shareholders is not conducive to reducing the non-performing loan ratio.