控股股东干预与国有上市公司薪酬契约有效性:来自董事长/CEO纵向兼任的经验证据

Controlling Shareholder Intervention and Effectiveness of Compensation Contract of SOE: Evidence from the Vertical Interlock of Chairman/CEO

以董事长/CEO在非上市控股股东单位兼任为切入点,本文分析控股股东干预对国有上市公司薪酬契约有效性的影响。结果发现,董事长/CEO纵向兼任会提高企业薪酬水平,降低薪酬—业绩敏感度。进一步的检验发现,董事长/CEO纵向兼任会显著降低高管薪酬、提高员工薪酬、降低员工薪酬—业绩敏感度,缩小高管-员工薪酬差距。本文的研究结果支持国有上市公司董事长/CEO纵向兼任的“和谐目标”假说,即纵向兼任增强了非上市控股股东的干预程度,导致上市公司承担更多的员工和谐目标,进而降低国有上市公司薪酬契约有效性。就监管政策而言,本文的研究结果意味着,我国需要同时进行非上市国有股东和国有上市公司的市场化改革,以提高国有企业的效率。

From the prospect of vertical interlock of chairman/CEO in non-listed controlling shareholder, this paper analyses the impact of controlling shareholder intervention on the effectiveness of the compensation contract of the listed SOE. The results show that the concurrent chairman/CEO will improve the compensation level and reduce the sensitivity relation between pay and performance. Further tests indicate that the concurrent chairman/CEO can significantly improve employee pay, reduce employee pay - performance sensitivity, decrease executive pay, and reduce the executive-employee pay gap. The results support the hypothesis of harmonious goal of concurrent chairman/CEO, that is, non-listed SOE shareholders impose social harmony goals on listed SOE by concurrent chairman/CEO, thereby reducing the effectiveness of compensation contracts. The policy implication is that, in order to improve the efficiency of SOE, we need to further implement the market-oriented reform of non-listed controlling shareholder and listed SOE at the same time.