政治关联对商业银行经营绩效的影响研究——兼论宏观经济目标与董事会治理的调节作用

On the Effect of Political Connection on Commercial Bank Performance:Also on the Moderating Role of Macroeconomic Goals and Board Governance

“发展观”认为政治关联能通过政府给予商业银行利益输送项目使得商业银行保持绩效增长,而“政治观”认为政府与商业银行保持政治关联的目的是为了将经济政策施压给商业银行,这会削减商业银行绩效,增加其不良贷款。在此背景下,基于2007—2016年我国14家上市商业银行面板数据,实证分析政治关联对商业银行经营绩效的影响,并判断宏观经济目标和董事会治理对该影响的调节作用,其结果显示,政治关联能显著提高商业银行的财务绩效,同时政治关联也能增加商业银行的不良贷款率;宏观经济目标的调控会降低政治关联对商业银行财务绩效的正影响,同时会加大政治关联对商业银行不良贷款率的正影响;董事会治理对政治关联与商业银行财务绩效关系没有显著影响,但会降低政治关联对不良贷款率的正影响。

The “development view” believes that political connection can promote the performance of commercial banks through interest-transferred government project, while the “political view” believes that political connection can weaken the performance of banks by increasing the bank's non-performing loans through the government-guiding banks to implement economic policies. Based on the panel data of 14 commercial banks from 2007 to 2016, we study the impact of political connection on bank performance, and explore the moderating effect of government's macroeconomic goals and board governance. The empirical analysis shows that political connection can significantly improve the banks' financial performance, while political connection can also increase the banks' non-performing loan ratio. The macroeconomic goals will reduce the positive impact of political connection on banks' financial performance, but it will increase the positive impact of political connection on bank non-performing loan rate. Board governance structure does not affect the relationship between political connection and bank financial performance, but it will reduce the positive effect of political connection on banks' non-performing loan rate.