不确定性对策略性投票的影响（英文）

How Does Uncertainty about Other Voters Determine a Strategic Vote?

如果选民不确定其他选民的偏好以及其他选民对他本人偏好的知晓程度,选票操纵的策略会变得更复杂。为了研究这种认知不确定性对策略性投票的影响,本文提供了一个形式分析框架并定义了选票操纵、优势偏好、均衡票况等概念。我们发现:即使真实偏好相同但关于偏好的高阶知识不同也会影响均衡票况。另外,本文还研究了不确定性的更新对选票操纵的影响,如某位选民对他本人的偏好进行公开宣告。我们证明了有些形式的选票操纵和均衡票况可以在这样的更新下得到保持,而另一些则不能被保持。最后,我们用一个逻辑语言形式化了不确定性选举的相关概念。本文的目的是给出一个分析和设计面向不确定性的投票机制的技术基础。

We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters,or about other voters’knowledge about her own preference.In this setting we define notions of manipulation,equilibrium,and dominance,under uncertainty.We provide scenarios wherein the profiles of true preferences are the same but the equilibrium profiles are different,because the voters have different knowledge about other voters.We also model actions that change such uncertainty about preferences,such as a voter revealing her preference.We show that some forms of manipulation and equilibrium are preserved under such uncertainty updates and others not.We then formalize epistemic voting terminology in a logic.Our aim is to provide the epistemic background for the analysis and design of voting rules that incorporate uncertainty.