政府控制、管理层权力和投资效率——基于2013—2017年沪深A股国有上市公司的实证分析

Government control, Management Power and Investment Efficiency——An Empirical Analysis Based on State-owned A-share Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2017

政府控制以及管理层权力正通过不同途径影响着企业的投资效率。文章选取2013—2017年沪深A股国有上市公司作为样本,以投资效率估计模型为切入点,对政府控制、管理层权力和企业投资效率之间的相互关系进行了回归分析。结果发现,在控制其他条件的情况下,管理层权力越大,企业投资效率降低的可能性越大,且地方政府控制企业的管理层权力对企业投资效率的影响尤为显著。为有效提高企业投资效率,文章提出两方面建议:一方面应在给予管理层更大经营自主权的同时,完善其监督与约束机制;另一方面则应将管理层权力约束的重心向地方政府控制型企业转移。

Government control and management power are affecting the investment efficiency of enterprises in different ways. By choosing the state-owned A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2017 as samples, and taking the investment efficiency estimation model as the starting point, this paper conducts a regression analysis of the relationship between government control, management power and enterprise investment efficiency. It finds that the increase of management power under the control of other conditions will lead to the relatively lower investment efficiency of the enterprise. Moreover, the management power of local government control enterprises has an especially significant impact on enterprise investment efficiency. In order to improve the efficiency of enterprise investment, this article provides two suggestions: on the one hand, we can improve the supervision and restraint mechanism while giving the management more autonomy;on the other hand, we should shift the focus of the power restraint of the management to the local government-controlled enterprises.