摘要
针对现有文献忽略排污企业之间信息交互影响估值的情形,在关联价值的信息结构下,设计了一种网上拍卖机制,以实现初始排污权公平有效的分配。首先,描述了排污企业的关联估值特征及其在排污权初始分配市场上的行为特点,其次,建立了排污产生社会总效益最大化的优化模型,从而提出了具体的拍卖机制,再次,通过理论分析表明,该机制不仅能够实现地方政府的即时决策,而且能够吸引更多的排污企业自愿参与排污权初始分配,激励排污企业披露真实的到达时间、离开时间和评价信息,优化配置排污权。最后,利用算例说明了所提出机制的适用性和可操作性。
For the effects of polluters' information interaction on their value, which is neglected by the existing literature, an online auction mechanism with interdependent values to realize a fair and efficient allocation of initial emission permits is designed.Firstly, characteristics of interdependent values and market behaviors of polluters are described.Secondly, an optimization model is established to maximize the income of society induced by sewage, and then, the concrete mechanism is offered on the basis of the model.Thirdly, it is proved that the mechanism can not only make real-time decisions but also attract polluters to volunteer for the auction and incentive each polluter to declare its truthful arrival time, depart time and evaluation information, thus realizing optimal allocation of the emission permits resources.Finally, a numerical example is given to show the applicability and operability of the auction mechanism proposed in this paper.
作者
王雅娟
吴杰
邵嫄
王先甲
WANG Ya-juan;WU Jie;SHAO Yuan;WANG Xian-jia(School of Management,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430081,China;Center for Service Science and Engineering,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430081,China;School of Business Administration, Guangdong University of Finance, Guangzhou 510521;School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)
出处
《中国农村水利水电》
北大核心
2019年第7期174-177,188,共5页
China Rural Water and Hydropower
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71601150,71501147,71231007)
关键词
排污权初始分配
关联价值
网上拍卖
机制设计
initial allocation of emission permits
interdependent values
online auction
mechanismdesign