国有企业人力资源预算管理的运行机制与效应——基于双层博弈模型的案例研究

Operation Mechanism and Effect of Human Resource Budget Management in China’s State-Owned Enterprises——A Case Study Based on the Two-level Game Theory

文章以A地区C民航国有企业为个案,利用“双层博弈”的分析框架,分析国有企业人力资源预算管理运行机制中“自上而下”和“自下而上”的博弈过程,讨论在双层博弈过程中不同政府部门与国企管理层决策考虑的因素及其对国企人力资源预算管理的影响。研究发现:存在“获胜集合”的情况下,“两低于”预算管理机制具有积极作用,部分解决了信息不对称情况下政府对国企监管难的问题;未来,随着国有企业与政府部门之间的“获胜集合”越来越小,“两低于”预算管理机制的负面作用可能凸显。

Taking the civil aviation state-owned enterprise C in A region as an example,this artide analyzes the“top-down”and“bottom-up”game processes in the operation mechanism of the human resources budget management in state-owned enterprises by referring to the analysis framework of“two-level game”.It discusses the factors of different government departments and state-owned enterprise managers decision-making considerations in two-level game and their impact on human resource budget of state-owned enterprises.It’s found that under the circumstance of “win- sets”,the “two below” budget control mechanism has a positive effect,partially solving the problem of the difficulty of the government supervision on state-owned enterprises under the condition of information asymmetry.In the future,the“win-sets”between the state-owned enterprises and government departments are getting smaller and smaller,and the negative effects of budget control mechanism may be highlighted.