考虑风险厌恶的混合型双渠道供应链定价决策

Hybrid dual-channel pricing mechanism with risk-averse supply chain

为了帮助企业与客户通过产品信息的共享与服务等建立持久关系,对混合型双渠道供应链定价机制进行了研究.首先在混合型双渠道模式下建立了考虑制造商和零售商的风险厌恶的均值方差模型,其次利用Stacklberg博弈方法分别讨论了在满足特定条件下的集中决策、分散决策以及信息不对称下供应链的最优决策.研究表明,在信息不对称的情况下当制造商对零售商的风险厌恶程度低估时,制造商和零售商的最优定价及期望总收益均要低于完全信息下的最优定价,而制造商对零售商的最优批发价要高于完全信息下的最优批发价.最后给出供应链的风险承载能力对集中决策、分散决策、信息不对称下最优定价的影响,数值结果对供应商和销售商的定价具有参考意义并能指导生产销售实践.

To help enterprises and customers for establishing long-term relationships through product information sharing and service,the pricing mechanism of hybrid dual-channel supply chain is studied.Firstly,a mean-variance model considering the risk aversion of manufacturers and retailers is established in the context of the hybrid dual-channel model.Secondly,the optimal pricing strategies with certain conditions under centralized,decentralized and information asymmetry are obtained,respectively,by using the Stacklberg game approach.The results show that when the risk aversion of manufactures and retailers is underestimated under the asymmetry information case,the optimal pricing and total expected revenue are lower than those in the complete information case,while the optimal wholesale price is opposite.Finally,a numerical example is given to illustrate the influence of the risk bearing capacity on the optimal pricing in centralized,decentralized and asymmetric information cases.The numerical results provide significant references for suppliers and retailers pricing and practices.