摘要
以2000-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,考察CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系、内部控制质量对代理成本的影响,研究发现:CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系能显著降低代理成本;随着公司内部控制质量的提高,CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系对代理成本的降低程度越来越低。进一步研究发现:CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系只在非国有企业、CEO为男性的样本中能显著降低代理成本。
Based on samples from China's listed companies(2000-2015)to test the relevance between hometown connectedness between the CEO and the board of directors,the quality of internal control and agency cost,it can be found that:hometown connectedness between the CEO and board of directors can significantly reduce agency cost;with the improvement of the quality of internal control,hometown connectedness between the CEO and board of directors would play a weaker role in reducing agency cost.Further results found that:there is significantly negative relevance between hometown connectedness between the CEO and the board of directors and agency cost only when the listed companies are non-state-owned listed companies,the gender of CEO is male.
作者
张十根
ZHANG Shigen(School of Accounting,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang,Jiangxi330013,China)
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第4期88-94,共7页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272198)
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71332004)
国家社科基金十九大专项课题(18VSJ082)
关键词
代理成本
“老乡”关系
内部控制质量
公司治理
Agency cost
Hometown connectedness
Quality of internal control
Corporate governance
