大学科技城政企学研协同创新三方演化博弈研究

Research on Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Government-Enterprise-University Research Cooperative Innovation in University Science City

基于有限理性和不完全信息假设,构建大学科技城管委会、企业和学研方三方的演化博弈模型,考量三方共同作用的演化稳定策略和博弈演化过程。结果发现:大学科技城协同创新演化策略是三方主体共同作用的结果,只研究单一主体的演化决策具有局限性;学研方和企业参与协同创新的意愿与大学科技城的相关政策有关;学研方和企业参与协同创新的意愿与大学科技城主体的互信程度有关;大学科技城管委会选择监管的意愿与监管收益有关。

Based on the bounded rationality and incomplete information hypothesis,this paper constructed an evolutionary game model of the three parties of the university science and technology city management committee,enterprises and research institutes,and analyzed the evolutionary stability strategy and game evolution process of the joint action of the three parties.The research finds that the collaborative innovation and evolution strategy of university science and technology city is the result of the joint action of the three parties.Only the evolutionary decision of a single entity has limitations.Enterprises and academics can strengthen the communication,determine the appropriate expected income distribution ratio,enhance the complementary resources,reduce the cost of collaborative innovation,and the management committee can reduce the cost of supervision,increase penalties for speculation,and reward participation in collaborative innovation which can effectively promote the evolution of the synergistic innovation state of the three parties toward the ideal.