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食品安全溯源追责中消费者搭便车行为研究——依据实验室模拟的经济学分析 被引量:1

Consumers’ Free Riding in Traceability and Responsibility of Food Safety——Based on an Economic Analysis Simulated in Lab
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摘要 消费者的溯源追责对于食品安全事业的发展具有重要意义。在现实生活中,部分消费者面对食品安全事件时会选择不进行追责,原因之一就是期望其他消费者去进行追责,即消费者有搭便车的行为倾向,这种行为严重影响到消费者溯源追责的积极性。运用实验经济学方法,通过实验室模拟有偿实验探索消费者在食品安全溯源追责中的搭便车行为,通过变换不同实验条件作为对照组,探究不同因素对消费者食品安全溯源追责中搭便车行为的影响。研究结果发现,溯源追责回报,提升消费者对食品安全追溯体系认知,强化法治教育,有助于减弱消费者在食品安全溯源追责中的搭便车行为倾向。因此,应通过提高消费者溯源追责的利益回报,加强对食品安全追溯体系的宣传力度,推进社会主义核心价值观教育,健全食品安全相关法律法规体系等方法,减少消费者食品安全溯源追责中搭便车行为。 Consumers tracing to the source and investigating the responsibility for food safety incidents is of much significance for the development of food safety.In real life,some consumers often choose not to investigate the responsibility of relevant personnel or organizations when they encounter food safety incidents.One of the reasons is that they expect other consumers to hold relevant personnel or organizations accountable,that is,they choose to be a free rider,which seriously affects most consumers'initiative of traceability and responsibility.The method of experimental economics is used to analyze consumers'free riding in traceability and responsibility of food safety by simulating paid experiment in lab,and the effect of different factors on consumers'free riding in traceability and responsibility of food safety is discussed with different experimental conditions used for contrast.Result shows that factors such as consumers being rewarded for their traceability and responsibility of food safety,their cognition of the system of traceability and responsibility of food safety improved,and the education of legality strengthened are helpful to reducing consumers'free-riding behavior in the traceability and responsibility of food safety.To reduce consumers'free-riding behavior in traceability and responsibility of food safety the reward to consumers should be increased for their traceability and responsibility in food safety,the propaganda of the system of traceability and responsibility of food safety strengthened,the education of socialist value outlook promoted,and food safety related laws and regulations completed.
作者 张琳 ZHANG Lin(College of Literature,Art and Management,Hebei Agricultral University,Cangzhou 061100,Hebei Province,China)
出处 《沈阳农业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2019年第2期169-174,共6页 Journal of Shenyang Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 国家社会科学基金青年项目(13CGL128)
关键词 消费者 溯源追责 搭便车 食品安全追溯体系 实验经济学 consumer tracing to the source and investigating the responsibility free riding traceability system of food safety experimental economics
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