经常性与非经常性损益分类操纵——来自业绩型股权激励“踩线”达标的证据

Classification Shifting Between Recurring and Nonrecurring Items:Evidence from Performance-Based Equity Incentive Plans

本文基于我国上市公司的业绩型股权激励实践,研究公司是否对经常性与非经常性损益进行分类操纵。本文发现,近20%的观测(公司方案-年)在待权期内年度业绩考核时“踩线”达标行权业绩条件;而这些“踩线”达标公司的异常扣除非经常性损益后的净利润与营业外支出正相关性更强;当审计师专业能力较弱或独立性更低时,抑或管理层现金报酬更低时,分类操纵行为更为明显。本文进一步研究还发现,公司更可能在首个业绩考核年度中使用损益分类操纵,而在后续的业绩考核年度中进行真实盈余管理,这意味着管理层在股权激励多期考核情境下对3种盈余管理方式的成本收益做出了综合考量。总体上,本文的发现意味着,股权激励“踩线”达标公司通过将经常性费用藏匿于营业外支出(尤其是识别难度更大的其他营业外支出)的方式对经常性与非经常性损益进行了分类操纵。

In this paper,we utilize performance-based equity incentive plans implemented by firms listed in China to examine whether firms use classification shifting between recurring and nonrecurring items to boost earnings excluding nonrecurring items. We document that almost 20% of observations slightly meet the vesting performance target. For these suspicious observations,the positive association between unexpected earnings excluding nonrecurring items and nonoperating expenditures are stronger. The effect is more pronounced when firms hire non-big 10 auditors,or when firm executives’ cash compensation is relatively more important. Further evidence shows that classification shifting is mainly concentrated in the first performance evaluation period,while firms are more likely to adopt real earnings management in the subsequent evaluation periods. These findings imply that executives balance the pros and cons of different earning management tools under the multi-period performance evaluation requirement. Overall,our paper provides evidence for executives’ classification shifting behavior,i.e.,they shift(classify)operating expenses into non-operating expenditures(a part of nonrecurring items)to boost earnings excluding nonrecurring items.