引入广告商的双边平台增值服务策略研究

Research on the Strategy of Value-Added Services for a Two-Sided Platform Introducing Advertisers

为探究在有广告商参与的前提下,双边平台提供不同类型增值服务的最优策略,文章将广告商作为独立的参与方,构建多边市场的盈利模型。用户和商户会通过交叉网络外部性互相影响,同时考虑到用户对广告的厌恶程度仅与广告时长有关,以及平台的维护成本与使用增值服务的人数相关,通过建模分析和数值模拟发现:平台针对用户和商户的定价决策与交叉网络外部性正相关;广告费决策因潜在客户规模不同而有所差异;平台对增值服务的类型和质量决策会相互影响,并对现实中双边平台倾向于仅为单个用户提供增值服务做出理论解释。

In order to explore the optimal strategy for two-sided platforms introducing advertisers to provide different types of value-added services, this paper regards advertisers as an independent participant to build a model for the multilateral market. Users and merchants will interact with each other through cross-network externalities. And this article considers that users' aversion to advertising is only related to advertising duration, and the maintenance cost of the platform is related to the number of people using value-added services. Through modeling analysis and numerical simulation, it finds that the pricing decisions for users and merchants are positively related to cross-network externalities. Advertising fees vary according to the scale of potential customers. The platform's decision on the type and quality of value-added services will affect each other, and this paper also provides a theoretical explanation for the fact that two-sided platforms tend to provide value-added services to individual users.