“可证伪的”与波普尔证伪标准的约定主义阴影

“Falsifiable”and the Conventionalist Factor in Popper’s Falsification Standard

一些学者把波普尔的“证伪”标准理解为实验证伪,并以科学实验中特设性假说的存在来反驳“证伪”理论的客观有效性,这其实是对波普尔“证伪”理论原意的一种误解。面对这些误解性批判,波普尔通过“可证伪的”与“可证伪性”两个概念的区分,避开了特设性假设给“证伪”理论带来的疑难:“可证伪的”面对的是纯粹的逻辑问题,“可证伪性”面对的是经验的实验证伪问题,波普尔申明他的“证伪”理论主要指的是前者。然而“证伪”理论作为一个纯粹的逻辑问题,其有效性却依靠当事人对某一陈述或理论的逻辑前提的主观设定。面对这一情况,波普尔不得不引入实验证伪的重要性来挽救纯粹逻辑划界标准的客观有效性。

Some scholars interpret Popper's"falsification"standard as experimental falsification,and refute the objective validity of"falsification"theory with the existence of special hypothesis in scientific experiments.This is actually a misunderstanding of Popper's original meaning of"falsification".Faced with these misunderstanding criticisms,Popper avoided the difficulties brought to the theory of falsification by the special hypothesis through the distinction between the two concepts of“Falsifiable”and“falsifiability”:“falsifiable”is facing a purely logical problem,and“falsifiability”is facing an experiential falsification problem.Popper affirmed that his“falsification”theory mainly refers to the former.However,as a purely logical issue,the validity of“falsification”theory relies on the subjective setting of the logical premise of a statement or theory by the parties concerned.Faced with this situation,Popper had to introduce the importance of experimental falsification to save the objective validity of pure logic demarcation criteria.