摘要
诺齐克不相信罗尔斯公平正义这种通常形式的分配正义有可靠的逻辑和道德基础。他批评它们的非历史原则、模式化和接受者正义的弱点。他不认同差异原则,认为它充满反例,侵犯个人权利。差异原则无论对于重叠共识还是平等主义都是一个难点,它关乎平等的范围和限度。诺齐克的个人自愿行动的权利转让体系对社会本身的理念、全面的政治关系的考虑不完全周全,它偏重道德基础论证,但缺乏共识性考虑。不难看出,罗尔斯的正义共识理想比之诺齐克的权利正义观就缺乏理论基础。
Nozik doesn’t think that a unit distribute view of jusitce as Rawls’ has a logic and ethic basis.He find that they are teleological,modeling and accepting.In particular,he does’ t agree with the diffirence princeple which he thinks offend individual right wrongly and has many counterexamples.This princeple is a difficult issue for both the overlapping consensus and egalitarian.Because, It concerns the scope and extent of equeality.But, in his right theory of individual willing transference, his consideration about the idea of society and the whole political relationship is not enough.To prove a theory of justice, he prefers the ehtic basis to the possibility of concensus.His theory of right has no more basis than Rawls’ concensus of political justice.
出处
《理论界》
2019年第5期39-44,共6页
Theory Horizon
基金
2016年度国家社会科学基金一般项目(16BKS121)的研究成果