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考虑知识溢出下产业集群创新网络协同知识创造决策分析 被引量:8

Decision making analysis of collaborative knowledge creation in industrial cluster innovation network considering knowledge spillover
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摘要 协同知识创造对于企业维持和获取竞争优势具有重要作用,但是知识外溢会对企业的竞争力造成威胁,从而使企业在创新网络协同知识创造决策时陷入两难困境。鉴于此,通过构造由一个核心企业和n个从属企业组成的创新网络在协同知识创造过程中知识投入决策Stackelberg博弈模型,引入知识内溢系数、私有知识、知识外溢损失等变量,探讨知识溢出下,网络成员的知识投入决策和知识产出分配问题。研究结果表明:核心企业与从属企业的知识投入比和知识投入总量与协同知识创造绩效和知识内溢收益之和有关,而与私有知识外溢的损失无关;集群创新网络协同知识创造机制得以运行的条件是核心企业的知识创造收益(即知识创造绩效与知识内溢收益之和)足够大;核心企业的知识投入比与其边际收益和知识内溢系数正相关,与从属企业的边际收益和知识内溢系数负相关;协同知识创造过程中从属企业会根据其边际收益和知识内溢系数按比例分配知识的投入比。 Collaborative knowledge creation is important for firms to maintain and gain new competitive advantages,but knowledge outgoing spillover harms their competitive advantages, which puts them into a dilemma when making knowledge creation decision in innovation network. In this paper, the collaborative knowledge creation in innovation network is modeled as a Stackelberg leader-follower game with one core firm and multisubordinate firms. We discuss the knowledge input decision and knowledge output allocation of network members by introducing the knowledge incoming spillover coefficient, private knowledge, knowledge outgoing spillover loss and other variables. Through the analysis, we find that: 1) The core firm and the subordinate firm’s knowledge input rate and the total amount of knowledge input are related with gains from collaborative knowledge creation fruits and knowledge incoming spillover profit, but are not related with private knowledge outgoing spillover loss;2) The condition that the collaborative knowledge creation mechanism in cluster innovation network runs is that the core firm’s knowledge creation profit(i.e. gains from knowledge creation fruits and knowledge incoming spillover profit) is big enough;3) The core firm’s knowledge input rate is positively related to its marginal gain and the knowledge incoming coefficient, and it is negatively related to the subordinate firm’s marginal gain and knowledge incoming coefficient;4) In the process of collaborative knowledge creation, the subordinate firms will allocate the investment rate of knowledge according to the marginal gain and the knowledge incoming coefficient.
作者 庄彩云 陈国宏 ZHUANG Cai-yun;CHEN Guo-hong(School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116,China;Business School, Yango University, Fuzhou 350015, China)
出处 《控制与决策》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2019年第7期1521-1528,共8页 Control and Decision
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70973022,71403052) 国家社会科学基金后期项目(15FGL005) 福建省软科学基金项目(2015R0002) 福建省高校新世纪优秀人才计划项目(闽教科2015[54]号) 福建省社会科学规划项目(FJ2016C030)
关键词 创新网络 产业集群 知识溢出 协同知识创造 知识投入决策 STACKELBERG博弈 innovation network industrial cluster knowledge spillover collaborative knowledge creation knowledge input decision Stackelberg game
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