基于制造商创新的零售商需求预测信息共享研究

Retailer’s Demand Forecasting Information Sharing Based on Manufacturer’s Innovation

针对制造商创新投入不足和零售商缺乏信息共享动机的问题,构建了由单个(进行成本降低创新的)制造商和单个(拥有需求预测信息的)零售商组成的两级供应链模型,求解了供应链双方的均衡决策和事前利润,比较了制造商在不同信息共享情形下的创新投入。研究发现:当制造商的创新能力较强时,制造商和零售商的信息共享价值均为正,供应链能够自发实现信息共享。此时,制造商的创新投入与其所获得的随机需求预测量、零售商的风险厌恶程度正相关。当制造商的创新能力较弱时,零售商的信息共享价值为负,制造商可以通过支付信息共享费用来激励零售商共享需求预测信息,从而实现供应链的帕累托改进。制造商支付的信息共享费用与自身的创新能力负相关,与零售商的风险厌恶程度正相关。

Focusing on lack of manufacturer’s innovation investment and retailer’s motivation to share information, this paper establishes a two-layer supply chain model consisting of a single manufacturer conducting cost-reduction innovation and a single retailer possessing demand forecasting information. And then, it solves the equilibrium decisions and ex ante profits of both parties and compares manufacturer’s innovation investment decisions under different information sharing circumstances. Results show that when the manufacturer’s innovation ability is strong, the information sharing value of the manufacturer and the retailer is positive, and the supply chain can realize the information sharing spontaneously. Manufacturer’s innovation investment is positively related to the acquired stochastic demand forecasting information and the degree of risk aversion of the retailer. When the manufacturer’s innovation ability is weak, the information sharing value of the retailer is negative, and the manufacturer can afford information sharing payment to encourage the retailer to share demand forecasting information in order to achieve the supply chain Pareto improvement. The information sharing payment is negatively related to manufacturer’s innovation capacity and is positively related to the risk aversion of the retailer.