环境保护、地方官员政绩考核与企业投资研究

Research on Environmental Protection, Performance Evaluation of Local Officials and Enterprise Investment

环境污染治理是党的十八大以来党和政府的工作重点,为此中央组织部于2013年12月颁布了《关于改进地方党政领导班子和领导干部政绩考核工作的通知》(下文简称《通知》),《通知》的颁布能否实现预期效果?本文以晋升锦标赛理论和财政分权理论为基础,以我国上市公司为样本,采用双重差分法对此进行研究,研究结果表明:《通知》颁布能显著抑制高污染企业的固定资产投资,实现政策制定目标,地区经济发展水平对上述关系具有正向调节作用。本文结论支持晋升锦标赛理论,与财政分权理论预期不符;本文结论也表明,政绩考核指标体系的设置及政府部门间的联动与合作对于实现《通知》制定的目标至关重要。

After the reform and opening up, China has achieved tremendous economic achievements. At the same time, China faces dramatic environmental deterioration. To solve this problem, Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee promulgates a new regulation about the performance evaluation of local government officials. To examine the effect of the regulation, using Difference-in-Differences method ( DID) and panel data of Chinese listed companies, this paper finds that the change of performance evaluation indexes affects the behaviors of local officials, and then affects the operating activities of highpolluting enterprises. Compared with low-polluting enterprises, fixed asset investment in high-polluting enterprises decreases significantly after the promulgation of the regulation. This conclusion supports the Promotion Tournament Theory instead of the Fiscal Federalism Theory. It also shows that the establishment of performance evaluation index system and the cooperation between government departments are very important to achieve the environmental protection goals.