政府补贴下的电子废弃物回收处理模型分析

Analysis on Decision of E-Waste Recycling and Processing under Government Subsidies

通过Stackelberg博弈理论构建政府补贴下的四种电子废弃物回收处理模型,包括制造商回收处理(MM)模型、零售商回收-制造商处理(DM)模型、回收处理一体商回收处理(U)模型和第三方回收商回收-制造商处理(RM)模型,并对模型中各主体的相关决策和利润函数进行比较分析。从理论和数值研究结果可知:四种模型中的最优批发价格和零售价格相等且与政府补贴无关,但回收价格、回收率、各主体利润和系统总利润会随着政府补贴的增加而增加;相对于其他三种模型,MM模型下的回收价格、回收率、制造商利润和系统总利润是最优的,但在零售商利润方面不及DM模型。建议从补贴方式、回收处理主体和政策制度等方面来优化电子废弃物回收处理系统。

Based on Stackelberg game theory, this paper develops four e-waste recycling and processing models under the government subsidies: manufacturer recycling and processing (MM), retailer recycling and manufacturer processing (DM), integrated recycler recycling and processing (U) and third-party recycling and manufacturer processing (RM). It makes a comparative analysis of decision and profit of different subjects in models. Result shows that the optimal wholesale and retail prices are equal and have nothing to do with government subsidies in the four models, but the recovery prices, the recovery rates, the profits of each subjects and the total profits will be increased with the government subsidies;The recovery price, the recovery rate, the manufacturer's profit and the total profit under the MM model are better than other models, but the retail profit is not as good as DM model. It is suggested to optimize e-waste recycling and processing system from subsidy modes, recycling subjects and policies.